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According to a familiar taxonomy, when it comes to justifying 
liberalism, we are faced with a camp roughly divided in two: 
on the one side we have teleological liberals, who defend 
liberalism as a conception of the good, i.e. as a way of life 
whose substantive values are the best available to us. On the 
other side we find deontological liberals, who defend 
liberalism as a conception of the right, the idea being that 
liberalism’s appeal consists mainly in its ability to arbitrate 
conflicts and generate a consensus between conceptions of the 
good through a theory of rights and justice. That distinction 
becomes particularly salient when we are confronted with the 
issue of how liberalism could and should cope with ethical 
diversity. More importantly, it is about this issue that both 
conceptions of liberalism have faced some of the most 
penetrating critiques. In this essay I characterise and assess a 
third way to ground liberalism, and in particular liberal 
toleration, namely through the idea of a modus vivendi 
(hereinafter MV). As I will show, this third approach—
exemplified in John Gray’s work—can be seen as one way to 
develop the new realist programme in political theory.2 
The term ‘modus vivendi’ has acquired some currency 
in contemporary political philosophy through the (rather 
derogative) use Rawls makes of it in Political Liberalism: “A 
consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on complying 
with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a 
convergence of self- or group interests.”3 Roughly, and with 
some qualifications that I will formulate below, that is also the 
sense I have in mind here. What is important to note for now 
is that MV, unlike the theories of justice that have come to 
                                                
1 Department of Political Science, Roeterseiland Campus, Po.box 15578, 
1001NB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E.Rossi@UvA.nl.  
2 For overviews of this current see Galston (2010) and Rossi & 
Sleat(2014). I discuss different aspects of the relation between MV and 
realism in Rossi (2010, 2013). 
3 Rawls (1993, 147 Rawls dismisses the idea of grounding liberalism in a 
‘mere MV’ because a MV, unlike the kind of settlement he terms 
‘overlapping consensus’, does not enjoy the moral allegiance of all 
involved parties.  
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constitute the dominant paradigm of recent political 
philosophy, is not (directly) a blueprint for the design of 
institutions, policies, and the like. Those theories spell out a 
set of evaluative criteria describing an ideal political model, 
and evaluate existing polities in accordance to their conformity 
to such model. Typically, it turns out that (one form of) 
liberalism is the only set of political norms that satisfies these 
criteria in full, or to the required degree. As I said, this 
combination of liberalism as a normative political theory—a 
set of political norms—and of its traditional justifications—a set 
of evaluative criteria—may lead some to think that in liberal 
theory there is no salient distinction between the evaluative 
and the normative level, in the sense that one particular set of 
evaluative criteria generates just one ideal set of norms. That 
seems true of both the deontological and the teleological 
traditional justifications of liberalism. However, while it is true 
that the evaluative level informs and shapes the normative 
level to some degree, the connection need not be one of strict 
entailment. In fact, here I rely on John Gray’s work to show 
that MV, while also a teleological theory, can be formulated as 
a more open-ended evaluative criterion (we will see later in 
what sense it is ‘open-ended’), rather than an ideal blueprint to 
be followed and approximated. More importantly, I shall argue 
that this evaluative criterion can be deployed as a justification 
for liberalism that, at least because of the way it can deal with 
the problem of diversity, is preferable to the more orthodox 
deontological or teleological justificatory strategies.4 But that is 
not good news for liberalism, for I will also argue that 
grounding liberal political authority in a MV undermines 
liberalism’s aspiration to occupy a privileged normative 
position vis-à-vis other kinds of regimes. So MV can save 
liberalism from moralism, but at cost many liberals will not be 
prepared to pay. 
 To reach that conclusion I shall proceed in the 
following way. First I discuss the problem of diversity and the 
traditional responses to it (section I); I shall then present some 
arguments as to why the traditional justifications of liberalism 
cannot adequately deal with this problem, and introduce the 
idea of MV as a way of overcoming this difficulty (section II). 
In section III I sketch a line of defence of the project of MV 
against a common objection and present my overall 
assessment of MV-grounded liberalism. 
 
 
                                                
4 To date, among the most articulate defences of the project of grounding 
liberalism in a MV is the one John Gray developed in a number of recent 
writings (1996, chs 2 and 6; 2000a; 2000b), which will indeed feature 
prominently in my analysis. Other promising defences of modus vivendi 
have been put forward by David McCabe (2010), John Horton (2006, 
2010), and Patrick Neal (1997). Claudia Mills (2000), Bernard P. 
Dauenhauer (2000), and Scott Hershowitz (2000) defended the idea of 
modus vivendi more narrowly, against Rawls’ reservations. 
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I 
Let us start by asking what it may mean that a normative 
political theory is superior in dealing with the problem of 
ethical diversity, and why that is important. What I have in 
mind here is not the idea, as common as unargued for in much 
recent literature, that a theory should aim at being inclusive 
towards ethical diversity. To say that a high level of 
inclusiveness constitutes a virtue of a normative political 
theory is a plausible claim, but it needs further argument: why 
should ethical diversity be desirable, or, for that matter, even 
admissible? There is no direct inference from the empirical 
acknowledgment of the fact of diversity to the normative 
advocacy of toleration. A normative political theory deals with 
the problem of ethical diversity by explaining what features (if 
any) of the fact of ethical disagreement call for its 
accommodation, and by providing evaluative criteria that 
follow from or are consistent with such explanation (Rossi, 
2008: 11-16).  
 We can now begin to look at how the traditional 
justifications deal with this problem. Gray argues that there is 
a mainstream in the way liberalism understands its justificatory 
status: “liberal toleration is the ideal of a consensus on the 
best way of life.”5 However, he argues, this view does not 
occupy the whole of the logical space available for the 
justification of liberal political institutions and practices. There 
is a second justificatory possibility: “the belief that human 
beings can flourish in many ways of life”, whereby liberalism 
becomes “the search for terms of peace among different ways 
of life” (Gray 2000: 1-2). Gray does not think that this second 
justificatory strategy has been confined to logical space 
throughout the history of political thought. He argues that it is 
present, even though perhaps just in nuce, in the writings of 
Hobbes, Hume, and more recently of Isaiah Berlin and 
Michael Oakeshott. However he also holds that these writers 
have exercised only a very limited influence on the 
development of liberal political philosophy. As we shall see, it 
is this second view (or ‘face’ of liberalism, as Gray puts it) that 
informs the idea of MV.  
Before analysing the dichotomy further, it is worth 
highlighting its affinities with the distinction between realism 
and moralism drawn by Bernard Williams (2005), and between 
realist and ‘ethics first’ political philosophy as conceived by 
Raymond Geuss (2008). The general thought common to all 
three thinkers—as well as to most contemporary realists—here 
is that coercive political orders cannot or at any rate should 
not be structured on the basis of pre-political moral 
commitments, i.e. commitments that float free of the practice 
of politics itself.6 
                                                
5 Gray 2000: 1. 
6 On this distinction see Jubb & Rossi (2015). 
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 Also notice that Gray’s dicothomy is about the 
justificatory status of a normative position, not about the 
normative position as such: what is being contested is not 
liberalism as a set of norms, but one way of justifying it, 
namely the reliance arguments that liberalism and liberal 
toleration are desirable because they are best and most rational 
form of life available to human beings. Now recall the 
familiar distinction between deontological and teleological 
liberalism. Both justificatory strategies can be analysed as 
responses to the problem of diversity.7 What is more, perhaps 
one of the most salient ways of characterizing the differences 
between them is to consider the differences in their answer to 
the problem of diversity. So it is strikingly odd that, in Gray’s 
distinction between the two faces of liberalism, both strategies 
are labelled in the same way; that they both fall under the 
umbrella of the project that grounds liberalism in a rational 
consensus on the best way of life.  
 One can see how this label could be applied to (certain 
forms of) teleological liberalism: consider for example the view 
that liberalism is best justified on the basis of a certain 
interpretation of the value of autonomy. The idea here would 
be that liberalism is justified because it enables us to live 
autonomous lives (such a position would of course then need 
the support of an argument as to why we should value 
autonomy, and so on). In Gray’s terminology, on this 
teleological view we would consent to liberalism because it 
enables us to live autonomously, i.e. to live the best possible 
life. 
 What about deontological liberalism? These theories 
present their position as a sort of non-substantive metatheory, 
which looks much more like the second face of liberalism 
described by Gray. This is particularely true of neutralism, the 
predominant model of deontological liberalism.8 Roughly this 
justificatory paradigm is based on the idea that giving priority 
to the right over the good will allow us to bracket conflicts 
among goods or interests, as it were. The main advantage of 
this strategy would be that the resulting normative principles 
                                                
7 This is not to say, of course, that it is only possible to conceptually make 
sense of them in the light of that problem; neither is it to say that they are 
to be understood primarily as responses to that problem –even though for 
deontological liberalism this is probably the case.  
8 Another reason for doing so is that Gray explicitly attacks neutrality as 
the dominant paradigm in his 2000b, and highlights its tight connection to 
deontological liberalism; however, the words ‘neutrality’, ‘neutralism’ or 
‘neutralistic’ are not even present in the index of 2000a. This is strange, 
because to a large extent 2000a presents a more articulated version of the 
arguments outlined in 2000b. I take it however that when Gray, in 2000a, 
refers to ‘legalistic’ liberalism he has in mind what is generally termed 
‘neutralism’, as this remark (among many) also confirms: “The shift from 
toleration of evils to neutrality regarding the good is such a shift. It has 
gone with an ambitious programme of reconstructing liberalism as a 
project in the philosophy of right. It is not by accident that the notion of 
neutrality has been associated with deontic liberalism.” (2000b: 326)  
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would be equally binding independently of agents’ different 
conceptions of the good. It doesn’t matter, then, whether 
those principles are at odds with the conception of the good 
of some of the agents they place under obligation, because 
morality, crudely, has nothing to do with the good, or with 
what we see as being our good. It is in this sense that the 
theory is neutral with regard to our conceptions of the good: 
the emphasis on the neutrality ostensibly implied by 
deontology is a way of presenting the advantages of 
deontology in an ethically fragmented environment. More to 
the point of our discussion, this emphasis on neutrality 
provides the grounding of toleration for the deontological 
justification of liberalism. This idea is, by and large, an 
offspring of the Kantian project of constructing morality as a 
pure philosophy of right.9 
 For now, however, let us just try to very briefly get a 
sense of how, from Gray’s perspective, it is possible to claim 
that this neutralistic brand of liberalism belongs to the 
traditional value-laden face of liberalism, despite its apparent 
committment to securing a set of norms that is immune to the 
demands of conflicting goods and conceptions of the good. 
The key to this claim can be found if we look at the sort of 
normative theory we obtain by giving priority to the right, i.e. 
a theory of justice, which adjudicates the conflicting demands 
of a multiplicity of goods and interests through the vindication 
of a set of rights. Now Gray’s contention is that in doing so 
these theories fail to deliver the priority of the right they are 
after, for the idea of justice is, as it were, an empty box if we 
do not understand the rights it embodies as protecting 
particular values, goods or interests.10  
 
The proposal that principles of neutrality or equality are 
constitutive or foundational in liberal morality, rather than 
any conception of the good, breaks down on the 
demonstration that such principles acquire a content only by 
way of substantive judgements about human well-being. We 
cannot resolve conflicts between the demands of different 
rights unless we can give weights to the interests they 
protect and promote. [...] That the good is prior to the right 
is not a substantive objection to any specific liberal theory 
                                                
9 Charles Larmore (1996) has shown how the project of Kantian 
deontology can be understood as a response to the fragmentation of the 
good (Ch. 1). He also traces some of the connections between this project 
and the ideal of liberal neutrality (Chs. 6 and 7). 
10 The point is not that pursuing justice equals to pursuing a conception of 
the good, becaue the citizens unite in the pursuit of a justice as a goal or 
an ideal. In a sense, Ralws is right in saying that there is a difference 
between pursuing justice and pursuing a conception of the good (1993: 
146n). Justice, as a concept (or goal, or ideal), is neutral with respect to 
conceptions of the good. The probem, however, is that each conception of 
justice (such as Rawls’ own ‘justice as fairness’, or Nozick’s libertarianism, 
etc.) will inevitably give priority to a set of goods and interests over 
others. 
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of rights. It is a necessary truth regarding all discourse about 
rights.11  
 
 This becomes most evident when there is a dispute in a 
judicial review board such as the US Supreme Court as to what 
are the normative implications of a certain constitutionally 
established right: the dispute boils down to a disagreement 
about exactly what interests or goods the right at stake should 
protect.12 Controversial as it may be, this line of argument 
against neutrality is both familiar and (at least) plausible, as it 
relies on the well-known interest theory of rights. Assessing 
the merits of this theory would be beside the focus of this 
paper.13 Thus we can grant Gray this point, in order to be able 
to move on and see where his broader view is headed. Before 
we do so, however, it may be worthwile to add just one 
observation about the background assumptions of Gray’s 
political philosophy. It is not by chance that Gray has come to 
rely on the interest-theory of rights. Just as this theory is based 
on the assumption that the driving concern of normative 
political philosophy is a concern for human well-being 
(broadly conceived), so is Gray’s overall project. Again, it is 
not possible to discuss this assumption here; however I trust 
that it is possible to proceed on this assumption without 
begging too many questions. After all, it is just the idea that 
political philosophy is about what sort of political 
arrarangements can enable us to live a good life in society. 
 In sum, if we are willing to follow Gray’s line of 
argument, we have established that the familiar distinction 
between deontological and teleological liberalism we started 
out with is somewhat misleading (at least for the purposes of 
this essay), for both traditional justificatory strategies cannot 
help being committed to the advancement of particular, 
substantial goods, values or interests.14 They either do it 
                                                
11 (Gray 2000b: 326-27)  
12 It is in this sense that Gray describes neutralistic liberalism as ‘legalistic’. 
For a discussion of how rights that supposedly settle conflicts between 
interests are (sometimes) not capable of doing so because of the fact that 
they themselves embody some such interests can be found in the 
jurisprudential work of Jeremy Waldron (1999, esp. part 3). The tradition 
of American Legal Realism advances similar contentions (Leiter 2005), so 
much so that a systematic study of its connection with the new political 
realism is now overdue. 
13 Will Kymlicka has shown that Rawls’ attempt to give priority to the 
right by promoting equal liberty and distribution of primary goods boils 
down to a position on what best promotes the good of citizens: “...Equal 
liberty and the distribution of primary goods are the most appropriate 
conditions for promoting our essential interest [...] Rawls and a 
perfectionist do not disagreee over the relative priority of the right and the 
good. They just disagree over how best to define and promote people’s 
good.” (1989: 35).  
14 I employ terms like ‘goods’, ‘values’ and ‘interests’ as what one might 
call ‘rough synonims’: there are differences between them that I am of 
course willing to acknowledge, but as far as my arguments are concerned, 
these differences can safely be ignored. Suffice it to say that a value, good 
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directly (as with traditional teleological liberalism’s 
endorsement of, say, autonomy), or indirectly (as with the 
promotion of a set of goods through a conception of justice), 
but the underlying pattern is the same, as far as we are 
concerned here. It is in this sense that we can speak, with 
Gray, of one traditional ‘face’ of liberalism. Whith that in mind, 
we can return to our original question and consider how this 
traditional approach fares as a response to the problem of 
diversity. As we shall see, Gray’s contention is that, no matter 
what particular value or set of values inform our justificatory 
efforts, there will always be an important sense in which the 
traditional approach to the justification of liberalism fails to 
address the problem of diversity.  
 
II 
In order to see what (if anything) is wrong with the traditional, 
value-laden face of liberalism we need to consider what 
philosophical explanation of the fact of disagreement about 
the good it can provide, and how its evaluative criteria relate 
to it. Gray’s idea is that, fundamentally, all traditional 
justifications of liberalism share the same strategy of response 
to the fact of ethical diversity: they do not take it seriously 
enough. To some extent, they all consider the fact of 
disagreement about value a superficial phenomenon of our 
experience, and ultimately all seek to explain it away and/or 
bypass it by appealing to a ranking of those values, a ranking 
informed by the value or by the set of values that consistutes 
the teleological kernel of their preferred version of liberalism 
(e.g. utility, autonomy, self-ownership, or the set of values and 
interests protected by any given conception of justice). Now 
the interesting question is whether it is actually possible to 
provide a well-grounded, uncontroversial account of value that 
plausibly supports (always) giving priority to this teleological 
kernel. Gray holds that this is not possible. On the contrary, 
for him values are irreducibly plural, conflicting, and, more 
importantly, incommensurable. 
 The ‘purality of values’ is not a metaphysical point 
about the numerical identity of values. This, as Ruth Chang 
observed, is an issue we can safely ignore if we are interested 
in the nature of values for purposes of normative theory.15 So 
Gray just means that our experience presents us with many 
conflicting value-bearing options.  
 As for incommensurability, this notion, which would be 
probably better described with the term ‘incomparability’, 
indicates that often in important deliberative scenarios we are 
                                                                                                     
or interest is something that provides a reason for action (the kind of 
reason—pro tanto, internal, external, etc.—depends on the general account 
of value we choose to employ. 
15 Chang 2001. The idea here is that, for the purposes of practical reason, 
conflict about values can indifferently be explained as a clash of different 
values (e.g. liberty vs. equality), or of different aspects of the same value 
(e.g. happiness). 
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not able to individuate a rational procedure for producing a 
ranking of those value-bearing options (let us conventionally 
call the countrary view ‘monism’).16 Incomparability, combined 
with the fact that those options are also often incompatible, 
causes many contradictory propositions about value to be true 
at the same time (e.g. ‘x is good for me now’ and ‘x is not 
good for me now’). Gray is adamant about this: “Again, to say 
that there are incommensurable values does not mean that the 
only way we can test our ethical beliefs is by assessing their 
consistency with one another. Indeed it is to say virtually the 
opposite. [...] Consistency is not an overriding virtue in 
ethics.”17 Now how can a normative theory be consistent with 
this view about value that allows for contradictions? It cannot. 
The normative outcome (if we may call it so) generated by 
such a view of value is ‘anything goes’, to put it crudely. 
 Before we move on to see how this value pluralism is 
connected to the idea of MV, let us consider on what grounds 
we can argue that this view of value is preferable to the 
monistic views that inform the traditional justifications of 
liberalism. The main argument for the preferability of value 
pluralism that can be extracted from Gray’s writings is the 
argument that value pluralism is, among the many accounts of 
the nature of value that are available to us, arguably the one 
that most closely matches our perception of the workings of 
ethical life, i.e. our daily experience of conflict and 
disagreement.18 As we have seen when we characterized the 
problem of diversity, we should beware from leaping from a 
fact about the world such as that of ethical disagreement, to 
assuming the truth of the value-judgements that participate in 
the disagreement. However, it also seems plausible to hold that 
the burden of proof is on those who, like the monists, defend 
the view that is most distant from the phenomenology of our 
moral experience. And in fact monistic arguments usually do 
not do a very good job of explaining (away) these phenomena. 
Despite this, the pluralistic view of value may still seem 
implausible to many. To mitigate this possible reaction, 
consider that pluralism need not be taken as a view about the 
objective nature of value. We can also understand it just as a 
form of epistemological prudence or moderation: a way of 
taking our disagreement about the good seriously and of 
                                                
16 On the distinction (and the frequent confusion) between 
inccommensurability and incomparability, see Chang 1997, “Introduction” 
(The point is that incommensurability occurs when we cannot put two 
values on the same scale; but that is not a necessary condition for a 
comparison to take place). How often we actually encounter such hard 
cases is something that Gray does not address; however a realistic 
assessment of this could give us a better sense of the relevance of the 
issue of incomparability. However, in general it seems at least plausible to 
say that such conflicts are rather common in our everyday experience. 
17 Gray 2000a: 41. 
18 Gray writes that “questions of value are answered at the bar of 
experience” (2000a: 64).  
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suspending our judgment about the various, competing 
explanations of the fact of ethical diversity. This need not be a 
strong form of scepticism, of the kind that denies the 
possibility of us ever being able to know how to rank (some) 
value-bearing options.19 The idea is just that, right now, this 
ranking task presents us with some serious difficulties. Even 
this weaker form of scepticism is controversial in its own 
rigtht; however it seems at least less controversial than the 
stronger version, and than any fully-fledged monistic view of 
value. In any case, we can go along wiht Gray’s pluralism for 
now, if only to move on to see what conclusions it yields. 
 Now, in the light of value pluralism, what exactly is the 
problem with the traditional justifications? Unlike what one 
may think, the problem is not with their normative 
narrowness, for no prescription of inclusiveness follows from 
such a radically pluralistic view of value: if instances of values 
are incomparable, we are unable to tell whether it is preferable 
to have, within a society, a large sampling of many (mutually 
incomparable) values, or a larger amount of fewer of those 
values. So, when Gray complains about liberalism being a 
‘monoculture’, he cannot (consistently) be using the familiar 
argument against liberalism from value pluralism, which claims 
that liberalism as a set of political institutions and practices is 
too narrow, not inclusive and tolerant enough (from a normative 
point of view).20 The problem with those ‘monocultures’ is 
rather at the level of their philosophical self-understanding, 
insofar as they claim to be more legitimate than (all) other 
regimes that privilege other values.21 More precisely, it is not 
that no regime can claim more legitimacy than any other; the 
point is on what grounds they do so. Liberalism’s traditional 
grounds, such as (say) a Kantian understanding of rights 
                                                
19 It is not clear whether Gray understands his value pluralism as a theory 
about the objective nature of value (that, for example, is clearly his 
interpretation of Berlin’s pluralism, which he uses in some of his own 
arguments as well), or as an epistemological idea. However some of his 
passing remarks, and most explicitly those in the final paragraphs of Two 
Faces of Liberalism, point towards such a sceptical interpretation of MV: “It 
would be idle to deny that modus vivendi is a sceptical view.”(2000a: 139) 
20 For a now almost classic formulation of this view, see Crowder 1994. A 
similar position had been taken before by John Kekes and by Gray himself 
(in a previous, anti-liberal phase). 
21 Gray does acknowledge that not all liberals are committed to full-scale 
temporal and geographical universalism. However he also holds that even 
the more particularistic liberals such as Raz tend to be committed to the 
view that, in some contexts, liberal values are necessarily to be raked before 
non-liberal ones. This is because those particularistic liberals rely on 
empirical assumptions about the better ‘performance’ (in delivering well-
being) of liberal values in certain societies, or on a philosophy of history 
that conceives of liberalism as the definitive etic for a certain historical 
context or for a certain stage in the moral evolution of humankind. Gray 
then argues that those empirical assumptions do not hold in the face of, 
say, the success of illiberal Asian values in capitalistic Western societies. 
He also dismisses philosophies of history that sanction the necessary 
priority of liberal values in certain contexts. 
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and/or an Enlightenment philosophy of history are not good 
grounds: on the pluralistic view of value, taken per se these 
grounds embody values as controversial as those of many 
other cultures.22  
 Let us now return to the ‘anything goes’ we extracted 
from Gray’s value pluralism, in order to see what we can or 
should make of it. Actually Gray argues that, as a matter of 
fact, it turns out that not exactly anything goes: there are some 
interests that all humans happen to have in common, because 
they are essential for the pursuit of any worthwile human 
existence.23 And to these goods or interests correspond some 
rights. A set of minimal, basic human rights that require 
protection. Note that this is not a form of backdoor monism. 
It is just an empirical matter, Gray claims, that people happen 
to have these interests in common; more importantly, even 
these fundamental goods can conflict with one another, hence 
there is no system of rights where all those values are 
protected to the same degree or ‘fairly’. Therefore, even 
though we may call the rights protecting those basic interests 
‘universal rights’ if we so fancy, they are not universal in the 
traditional sense of the term, for they are not entirely context-
independent: ”Human rights are not immutable truths, free-
standing moral absolutes whose contents are self-evident. 
They are conventions, whose concerns vary as circumstances 
and human interests vary”.24 In different contexts we 
understand our basic interests differently, we choose different 
trade-offs between them, and we develop different ways of 
protecting them.  
 And this is where the idea of MV comes into play: a 
MV is a settlement, achieved between the competing demands 
of the values and interests of the different actors that make up 
our societies, in which our basic rights are protected. Clearly, 
for this to be possible, we will need a condition of peaceful 
coexistence (or absence of violence), which could also be 
cashed out as another basic human right. There is no universal 
recipe for achieving a MV.25 The ways of pursuing peace are 
                                                
22 So notice the difference between Gray’s position and David McCabe’s, 
the other prominent attempt to ground modus vivendi liberalism in value 
pluralism. McCabe defends a form of “pluralist perfectionism” (2010: 
116), and so he does not shy away from embracing a robust conception of 
personal autonomy as the link between pluralism and modus vivendi 
liberalism. Whatever the merits of this position, it should be quite clear 
that its expressly moral character will not appeal to realists, so discussing 
it at length would take us far from this paper’s topic. 
23 It is not clear whether Gray understands these as merely negative 
interests (universal evils), or also positive ones. 
24 Gray 2000a: 106. 
25 What is more, depending on how much weight we want to put on the 
context-dependence of the way we understand our basic interests, it is not 
even certain that it will always be possible to achieve a MV: some group 
may construe its basic interests as incompatible with those of some other 
group. It seems however plausible to assume that these will be rather rare 
cases.  
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open too, because they depend on how we understand our 
basic rights: “human rights are convenient articles of peace, 
whereby individuals and communities with conflicting values 
and interests may consent to coexist.”26  
 At this point one might ask: if MV consists in a 
political theory of ‘anything goes’ (provided that peace and 
protection of basic rights are granted), why not be satisfied 
with liberalism? Certainly liberal regimes satisfy these 
conditions, one may go on to argue (as a matter of fact, if 
Gray’s analysis is correct, then a MV is already in place in most 
decent societies). But that would be a wrong reaction to the 
proposal of MV, for it would consider it as a normative 
proposal, whereas it is a merely justificatory one. Again, MV 
doesn’t want to change liberalism as a set of norms, but just 
the way we justify it. Liberal legislation should not prescribe 
things very different from those it currently prescribes. 
Liberals should rather change the language by which they 
support their prescriptions -recall that our whole discussion is 
about justifications, not norms. They should drop the language 
of justice, rights, or of the universal appeal of (say) the value 
of autonomy (for the pluralist view of value forbids to appeal 
to such robust views of value), and adopt the language of MV, 
i.e. of justifying political institutions as the best deal that can 
be struck between competing interests and conceptions of the 
good. 
 Before we move on to the next section, some general 
clarifications. We have seen that Gray’s value pluralism can be 
understood as a sceptical, perhaps antitheoretical position. It 
does not do any work towards a direct justification of MV, 
because it cannot justify any normative political theory. It 
cannot entail it, and not even be consistent with any such 
theory. The work it does it just that of undermining the 
traditional justifications for liberalism (and presusumably for 
most other normative political theories, but that is beyond the 
focus of this paper). So what pluralism does instead is to ‘clear 
the ground’ for MV: given that Gray’s value pluralism shows 
that no normative theory can be consistent with the correct 
understanding of value (for such understanding comprises true 
contradictory value judgements), there is nothing wrong with 
saying that ‘anything goes’. But then why is it that value 
pluralism does not also undermine the particular political 
institutions and norms protecting our basic rights in any given 
MV? The answer to this should become clear if we realise that 
the kind of justification provided by MV is different from that 
of the traditional justificatory strategies. As we have seen, the 
traditional strategies ground political norms by showing how 
they follow from the value or the set of values that constitute 
their teleological kernel. So, for example, an autonomy-based 
teleological foundation of liberalism would justify a norm 
protecting freedom of religion, because in order to honour the 
                                                
26 Gray 2000a: 105. 
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value of autonomy we need to allow individuals to freely 
choose between different religious views. Justification through 
MV, on the other hand, does not proceed in this deductive 
way. Rather, it is a way, for those subject to the political 
authority of the MV, of making sense of why they have come 
to a certain setllement, of what interests it protects and what 
purposes it serves, and so on. The idea is then that most 
people most of the time are expected to converge on the 
minimal view that protecting a set of basic human rights is in 
their best interest. This should not be taken as a way of 
relativizing the justification of political norms, or of giving up 
normativity and retreating to some sort of hermeneutic self-
understanding. This type of justificatory approach aims to 
enable the subjects of political authority to evaluate how the 
political system serves their purposes, and hence whether they 
have reason to (continue to) consent to it.  
  
III 
So far we have seen how MV is connected to a pluralistic 
account of value and what sorts of normative committments it 
generates. Now at least two important questions remain open. 
The first one is the main question this paper is meant to 
answer: can MV be used as a justificatory strategy for 
liberalism? It should be clear by now that on Gray’s view, in 
the contexts where it will not be possible to achieve a MV 
through liberal norms and institutions, the settlement that we 
will manage to get will still be justified. Considering and 
challenging this last point is thus crucial. The second question 
concerns the moral status of MV. Some critics of MV have 
argued that if we accept MV as a criterion for political 
legitimacy, we will end up bestowing approval upon morally 
inacceptable regimes. In a sense, this second worry is more 
serious than the first one: if not dealt with adequately, it will 
cast a shadow of (possible) moral blameworthiness on the 
project of MV, which would arguably make it futile to bother 
asking whether it is compatible with liberalism or other 
regimes.27  
 We start, then, from the worry about morality. We have 
just seen that Gray’s view of value (or at least a plausible 
interpretation of it) commits him to a sceptical or 
antitheoretical position. ‘Anything goes’, provided that 
protection of basic rights and peaceful coexistence are 
granted.28 Perhaps those who attacked this view as immoral 
                                                
27 That is not because I think that liberalism is by definition immune from 
charges of immorality; rather, because I maintain that a morally 
unsatisfactory version of liberalism is not worth pursuing. 
28 At this point one may worry, as George Crowder has done even for 
Gray’s less teleologically-articulated version of MV (2002: 121-122), that 
this way of presenting MV risks of focusing too much on peaceful 
coexistence and protection of universal values as a set of goals, thus 
making MV not very different from the traditional forms of teleological 
liberalism it is supposed to overcome. Indeed, surely MV is a teleological 
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should have said that it is amoral, not immoral; to accuse MV 
of immorality is besides the point, and in a sense begs the 
question, for it presupposes a view of value that is compatible 
with a broadly Kantian view of morality, and thus fails to take 
into account the peculiarity of the view of value that informs 
MV.  
 The moralistic critics claim that MV is often likely to 
legitimise unjust or unfair political settlements. From their 
perspective this is due to the fact that MV does not 
contemplate any neutral, fair procedure for the adjudication of 
conflicts between goods and interests. But the problem with 
this criticism seems to be that Gray’s view of value tells us that 
there is no way that morality, or ’rights’, or ‘justice’ can solve 
conflicts between our goods and interests. He is not trading 
morality against something else, such as peace; rather, he is 
saying that we cannot use morality (in the strict Kantian sense) 
when trying to settle conflicts about what is valuable to us. 
This point notably mirrors Raymond Geuss’ realist remark that  
“Ethics is usually dead politics: the hand of a victor in some 
past conflict reaching out to try to extend its grip to the 
present and the future.” (2010: 42).29  
 It will not do to reply, as some may want to do on 
Gray’s behalf, that MV is at least committed to the protection 
of basic needs or interests, and that is all morality is about, 
whereas all other goods, values and interests are morally 
indifferent preferences. This would be an odd line to take, and 
not even one that fits in the framework of Gray’s view of 
value. Moral minimalism will not satisfy the moralist. Besides, 
and more importantly, it seems to me that it is incorrect to 
refer to this core of basic interests as ‘morality’: in Gray’s view 
it is just a core of interests that all humans happen to share 
(and which also tend to be understood and protected in 
different ways in different contexts). The point is that there is 
nothing ‘moral’ about this, at least not ‘moral’ in the Kantian 
sense: these rights are conceived as reflecting a set of interests 
and goods, and not as a set of duties determined a priori as 
ways of (allegedly fairly) adjudicating the demands of 
                                                                                                     
theory, as Gray himself notes (2000a: ?). Now the interesting question is 
whether there are any significant differences in the structure of MV’s 
teleology, as opposed to that of the traditional teleological justifications of 
liberalism. It seems to me that there is at least one rather significant 
difference. In brief: unlike (say) utility for a classical utilitarian, peaceful 
coexistence and protection of basic rights for the advocate of MV are not 
a goal that is set ex ante, independently of any other considerations. That is 
to say that, whereas for a utilitarian in any possible world there will be a 
way of maximizing utility (at least in principle), a MV will not necessarily 
obtain. The feasibility of its goals is not decided ex ante, but is dependent 
on whether the parties in conflict actually happen to share enough 
common ground to be willing to engage in a MV. It is this contingency of 
its goals that differentiates MV from traditional teleology. In Gray’s own 
words, “The end of modus vivendi is not some supreme good –even 
peace. It is reconciling conflicting goods.” (2000a: 25).  
29 I expand on this issue in Rossi (2016). 
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conflicting goods and interests. The fact that we have these 
interests then generates duties (in fact Gray says that these 
goods/interests must be protected by corresponding rights), 
but it is clear that here the right is subordinated to the good, 
and in a strict Kantian sense this is not what morality is about.  
 It would be however unfair, on the basis of this point, 
to claim that MV is devoid of ethical content. There is room in 
MV for Aristotelian goodness(es), even though there is little or 
no room for Kantian morality. It is not that MV recognizes the 
possibility of morality and yet decides to ignore it. The point is 
rather that, on the radically pluralist view of value at the basis 
of MV, there is no room for morality when conflicts between 
goods are at stake (and that, especially in the realm of politics, 
is a permanent condition). The moralist would have us 
adjudicate conflicts between goods through a conception of 
the right, but that option is simply not available to us if we 
accept a pluralist account of value. In other words, the 
moralist blames the (realist) pluralist for their failure to deliver 
fairness in the arbitration of conflicts between goods and 
interests; but the pluralist denies that this is a feasible goal: 
what the moralist calls a ‘fair’ outcome is to the pluralist just a 
rather arbitrary advancement of one particular set of goods 
and interests over others. Thus if the moralist wants to 
challenge the pluralist on this terrain, she needs to show why 
one should give up the pluralist understanding of value in the 
first place. This understanding of value may very well be 
controversial; on the other hand, it is far from clear that the 
view of value presupposed by the moralistic critic of MV is 
any more compelling. There is at least a battle the moralist 
needs to fight here. 
 Those impressionistic remarks fall short of completely 
removing the worry about the moral status of MV. However, 
adequately following the line of argument I have sketched 
would lead us far way from the issues under consideration 
here, so for our present purposes it will have to remain a 
tentative suggestion. More importantly, the line of argument I 
suggested is not the only available if we want to defend MV 
from the charge of immorality, and arguably not even the most 
effective one. I chose to focus on it simply because (to my 
knowledge) it is not present in the literature.30  
                                                
30 For a different and more effective defense, see for example Horton 
2006: “Even when we have felt pressurised and agreed reluctantly to do 
something, we often still think ourselves bound so to act [...] Modus vivendi 
contains within it the idea that the resulting political accommodation or 
settlement is in some sense ‘acceptable’ to the parties to it: it is not the 
ruthlessly, coercive imposition of a particular set of arrangements by one 
party or another.”. This move anticipates what Bernard Williams (2005) 
calls the realist ‘basic legitimation demand’. For illuminating discussions of 
this notion see Hall (2013), Sagar (2014). It is also worth pointing out how 
the role of Williams’ ‘critical theory principle’ within his account of 
legitimacy tends to be played down by his liberal interpreters, and by 
liberal realists more generally.  
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 Let us now turn to the issue of whether MV can be 
deployed as a normative justification of liberalism. As I 
anticipated, it seems that if we want to use Gray’s formulation 
of MV, we cannot deploy it. The problem is that, in Gray’s 
theory, MV works as a mere treshold requirement for 
justification: once the minimal conditions of peaceful 
coexistence and protection of basic rights are met (and this is 
certainly possible to achieve even in very illiberal regimes), 
Gray’s conception of MV turns a blind eye to the differences 
between liberal and non-liberal polities. Thus liberalism ends 
up on a justificatory par with other regimes. And that is a 
problem if we want to use MV as a foundation for liberalism. 
It is a problem not in the sense that it makes libearalism less 
legitimate per se: liberal political systems may very often turn 
out to be justifiable as a MV (I actually struggle to imagine a 
version of liberalism that does not qualify as a MV). The worry 
is rather that it leaves us in a situation whereby, if some non-
liberals want to overthrow a liberal regime, we cannot object 
(provided that the non-liberals can show that their position 
satisfies the requirements of MV). So Gray’s conception of 
MV cannot be presented as a revival of the project of 
liberalism, for not only it is unable to show why liberalism 
should be preferable to other regimes, but it even fails to 
adequately defend liberal regimes that are already in place.31 
What is more, even if we can establish that liberalism is the 
best MV in a certain place ar a given time, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that, in the future, a better political arrangement 
will be devised. It is in fact in this sense that MV, as I said at 
the beginning, is an open-ended teleological theory: it does not 
claim to entail an account of what normative principles will 
always perform better in mediating conflicts between goods 
and interests and in delivering well-being in any given context, 
or even in one particular context.  
So it is clear that, even on this qualified version of the 
idea of MV, liberalism needs to give up more than just its 
traditional universalistic aspirations. It needs to give up its 
own self-understanding as a normatively privileged position 
vis-à-vis other ideologies. Now, liberal realists (Jubb 2015, Sabl 
2017, Sleat 2013) are typically happy to acknowledge the 
contingency of their view relative to liberal moralism. But the 
present reading of Gray suggests that this contingency—at 
least insofar as liberal realism is tied to the idea of MV—goes 
further than most liberals’ comfort zone. That may take 
realism, or at least MV, beyond liberalism and in both 
conservative and radical directions.32 As for liberalism itself, 
                                                
31 Both George Crowder (2002) and Glen Newey (2001), for example, have 
argued that MV cannot qualify as a liberal position, on grounds that could 
be reduced to the argument I presented here.  
32 To my knowledge, traditional conservative realism has not been 
developed systematically in contemporary political philosophy. For the 
radical tendency see Prinz (2015), Prinz and Rossi (2017), Raekstad (2016), 
Rossi (2015). 
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this essay may just have shown quite how literally we should 
take the old jibe that a liberal is someone who cannot 
take their own side in an argument.33  
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